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Part II
Part II
8. Laelius. Now you are really using force. It makes no difference what
kind of force you use: force it is. For it is neither easy nor right to refuse
a wish of my sons-in-law, particularly when the wish is a creditable one in
itself.
Well, then, it has very often occurred to me when thinking about
friendship, that the chief point to be considered was this: is it weakness and
want of means that make friendship desired? I mean, is its object an
interchange of good offices, so that each may give that in which he is strong,
and receive that in which he is weak? Or is it not rather true that, although
this is an advantage naturally belonging to friendship, yet its original cause
is quite other, prior in time, more noble in character, and springing more
directly from our nature itself? The Latin word for friendship - amicitia - is
derived from that for love - amor; and love is certainly the prime mover in
contracting mutual affection. For as to material advantages, it often happens
that those are obtained even by men who are courted by a mere show of
friendship and treated with respect from interested motives. But friendship by
its nature admits of no feigning, no pretence: as far as it goes it is both
genuine and spontaneous. Therefore I gather that friendship springs from a
natural impulse rather than a wish for help: from an inclination of the heart,
combined with a certain instinctive feeling of love, rather than from a
deliberate calculation of the material advantage it was likely to confer. The
strength of this feeling you may notice in certain animals. They show such
love to their offspring for a certain period, and are so beloved by them, that
they clearly have a share in this natural, instinctive affection. But of
course it is more evident in the case of man: first, in the natural affection
between children and their parents, an affection which only shocking
wickedness can sunder: and next, when the passion of love has attained to a
like strength - on our finding, that is, some one person with whose character
and nature we are in full sympathy, because we think that we perceive in him
what I may call the beacon-light of virtue. For nothing inspires love,
nothing conciliates affection, like virtue. Why, in a certain sense we may be
said to feel affection even for men we have never seen, owing to their honesty
and virtue. Who, for instance, fails to dwell on the memory of Gaius Fabricius
and Manius Curius with some affection and warmth of feeling, though he has
never seen them? Or who but loathes Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius,
Spurius Maelius? We have fought for empire in Italy with two great generals,
Pyrrhus and Hannibal. For the former, owing to his probity, we entertain no
great feelings of enmity: the latter, owing to his cruelty, our country has
detested and always will detest.
9. Now, if the attraction of probity is so great that we can love it not
only in those whom we have never seen, but, what is more, actually in an
enemy, we need not be surprised if men`s affections are roused when they fancy
that they have seen virtue and goodness in those with whom a close intimacy is
possible. I do not deny that affection is strengthened by the actual receipt
of benefits, as well as by the perception of a wish to render service,
combined with a closer intercourse. When these are added to the original
impulse of the heart, to which I have alluded, a quite surprising warmth of
feeling springs up. And if any one thinks that this comes from a sense of
weakness, that each may have some one to help him to his particular need, all
I can say is that, when he maintains it to be born of want and poverty, he
allows to friendship an origin very base, and a pedigree, if I may be allowed
the expression, far from noble. If this had been the case, a man`s inclination
to friendship would be exactly in proportion to his low opinion of his own
resources. Whereas the truth is quite the other way. For when a man`s
confidence in himself is greatest, when he is so fortified by virtue and
wisdom as to want nothing and to feel absolutely self-dependent, it is then
that he is most conspicuous for seeking out and keeping up friendships. Did
Africanus, for example, want anything of me? Not the least in the world!
Neither did I of him. In my case it was an admiration of his virtue, in his an
opinion, maybe, which he entertained of my character, that caused our
affection. Closer intimacy added to the warmth of our feelings. But though
many great material advantages did ensue, they were not the source from which
our affection proceeded. For as we are not beneficent and liberal with any
view of extorting gratitude, and do not regard an act of kindness as an
investment, but follow a natural inclination to liberality; so we look on
friendship as worth trying for, not because we are attracted to it by the
expectation of ulterior gain, but in the conviction that what it has to give
us is from first to last included in the feeling itself.
Far different is the view of those who, like brute beasts, refer
everything to sensual pleasure. And no wonder. Men who have degraded all their
powers of thought to an object so mean and contemptible can of course raise
their eyes to nothing lofty, to nothing grand and divine. Such persons indeed
let us leave out of the present question. And let us accept the doctrine that
the sensation of love and the warmth of inclination have their origin in a
spontaneous feeling which arises directly the presence of probity is
indicated. When once men have conceived the inclination, they of course try to
attach themselves to the object of it, and move themselves nearer and nearer
to him. Their aim is that they may be on the same footing and the same level
in regard to affection, and be more inclined to do a good service than to ask
a return, and that there should be this noble rivalry between them. Thus both
truths will be established. We shall get the most important material
advantages from friendship; and its origin from a natural impulse rather than
from a sense of need will be at once more dignified and more in accordance
with fact. For if it were true that its material advantages cemented
friendship, it would be equally true that any change in them would dissolve
it. But nature being incapable of change, it follows that genuine friendships
are eternal.
So much for the origin of friendship. But perhaps you would not care to
hear any more.
Fannius. Nay, pray go on; let us have the rest, Laelius. I take on myself
to speak for my friend here as his senior.
Scaevola. Quite right! Therefore, pray let us hear.
10. Laelius. Well, then, my good friends, listen to some conversations
about friendship which very frequently passed between Scipio and myself. I
must begin by telling you, however, that he used to say that the most
difficult thing in the world was for a friendship to remain unimpaired to the
end of life. So many things might intervene: conflicting interests;
differences of opinion in politics; frequent changes in character, owing
sometimes to misfortunes, sometimes to advancing years. He used to illustrate
these facts from the analogy of boyhood, since the warmest affections between
boys are often laid aside with the boyish toga; and even if they did manage to
keep them up to adolescence, they were sometimes broken by a rivalry in
courtship, or for some other advantage to which their mutual claims were not
compatible. Even if the friendship was prolonged beyond that time, yet it
frequently received a rude shock should the two happen to be competitors for
office. For while the most fatal blow to friendship in the majority of cases
was the lust of gold, in the case of the best men it was a rivalry for office
and reputation, by which it had often happened that the most violent enmity
had arisen between the closest friends.
Again, wide breaches and, for the most part, justifiable ones were caused
by an immoral request being made of friends, to pander to a man`s unholy
desires or to assist him in inflicting a wrong. A refusal, though perfectly
right, is attacked by those to whom they refuse compliance as a violation of
the laws of friendship. Now the people who have no scruples as to the requests
they make to their friends, thereby allow that they are ready to have no
scruples as to what they will do for their friends; and it is the
recriminations of such people which commonly not only quench friendships, but
give rise to lasting enmities. "In fact," he used to say, "these fatalities
overhang friendship in such numbers that it requires not only wisdom but good
luck also to escape them all."
11. With these premises, then, let us first, if you please, examine the
question - how far ought personal feeling to go in friendship? For instance:
suppose Coriolanus to have had friends, ought they to have joined him in
invading his country? Again, in the case of Vecellinus or Spurius Maelius,
ought their friends to have assisted them in their attempt to establish a
tyranny? Take two instances of either line of conduct. When Tiberius Gracchus
attempted his revolutionary measures he was deserted, as we saw, by Quintus
Tubero and the friends of his own standing. On the other hand, a friend of
your own family, Scaevola, Gaius Blossius of Cumae, took a different course. I
was acting as assessor to the consuls Laenas and Rupilius to try the
conspirators, and Blossius pleaded for my pardon on the ground that his regard
for Tiberius Gracchus had been so high that he looked upon his wishes as law.
"Even if he had wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" said I. "That is a
thing," he replied, "that he never would have wished." "Ah, but if he had
wished it?" said I. "I would have obeyed." The wickedness of such a speech
needs no comment. And in point of fact he was as good and better than his
word; for he did not wait for orders in the audacious proceedings of Tiberius
Gracchus, but was the head and front of them, and was a leader rather than an
abettor of his madness. The result of his infatuation was that he fled to
Asia, terrified by the special commission appointed to try him, joined the
enemies of his country, and paid a penalty to the republic as heavy as it was
deserved. I conclude, then, that the plea of having acted in the interests of
a friend is not a valid excuse for a wrong action. For, seeing that a belief
in a man`s virtue is the original cause of friendship, friendship can hardly
remain if virtue be abandoned. But if we decide it to be right to grant our
friends whatever they wish, and to ask them for whatever we wish, perfect
wisdom must be assumed on both sides if no mischief is to happen. But we
cannot assume this perfect wisdom; for we are speaking only of such friends as
are ordinarily to be met with, whether we have actually seen them or have been
told about them - men, that is to say, of everyday life. I must quote some
examples of such persons, taking care to select such as approach nearest to
our standard of wisdom. We read, for instance, that Papus Aemilius was a close
friend of Gaius Luscinus. History tells us that they were twice consuls
together, and colleagues in the censorship. Again, it is on record that Manius
Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were on the most intimate terms with them and
with each other. Now, we cannot even suspect that any one of these men ever
asked of his friend anything that militated against his honour or his oath or
the interests of the republic. In the case of such men as these there is no
point in saying that one of them would not have obtained such a request if he
had made it; for they were men of the most scrupulous piety, and the making of
such a request would involve a breach of religious obligation no less than the
granting it. However, it is quite true that Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato did
follow Tiberius Gracchus; and though his brother Gaius Gracchus did not do so
at the time, he is now the most eager of them all.
12. We may then lay down this rule of friendship - neither ask nor
consent to do what is wrong. For the plea "for friendship`s sake" is a
discreditable one, and not to be admitted for a moment. This rule holds good
for all wrong-doing, but more especially in such as involves disloyalty to the
republic. For things have come to such a point with us, my dear Fannius and
Scaevola, that we are bound to look somewhat far ahead to what is likely to
happen to the republic. The constitution, as known to our ancestors, has
already swerved somewhat from the regular course and the lines marked out for
it. Tiberius Gracchus made an attempt to obtain the power of a king, or, I
might rather say, enjoyed that power for a few months. Had the Roman people
ever heard or seen the like before? What the friends and connexions that
followed him, even after his death, have succeeded in doing in the case of
Publius Scipio I cannot describe without tears. As for Carbo, thanks to the
punishment recently inflicted on Tiberius Gracchus, we have by hook or by
crook managed to hold out against his attacks. But what to expect of the
tribuneship of Gaius Gracchus I do not like to forecast. One thing leads to
another; and once set going, the downward course proceeds with ever-increasing
velocity. There is the case of the ballot: what a blow was inflicted first by
the lex Gabinia, and two years afterwards by the lex Cassia! I seem already to
see the people estranged from the Senate, and the most important affairs at
the mercy of the multitude. For you may be sure that more people will learn
how to set such things in motion than how to stop them. What is the point of
these remarks? This: no one ever makes any attempt of this sort without
friends to help him. We must therefore impress upon good men that, should they
become inevitably involved in friendships with men of this kind, they ought
not to consider themselves under any obligation to stand by friends who are
disloyal to the republic. Bad men must have the fear of punishment before
their eyes: a punishment not less severe for those who follow than for those
who lead others to crime. Who was more famous and powerful in Greece than
Themistocles? At the head of the army in the Persian war he had freed Greece;
he owed his exile to personal envy: but he did not submit to the wrong done
him by his ungrateful country as he ought to have done. He acted as Coriolanus
had acted among us twenty years before. But no one was found to help them in
their attacks upon their fatherland. Both of them accordingly committed
suicide.
We conclude, then, not only that no such confederation of evilly disposed
men must be allowed to shelter itself under the plea of friendship, but that,
on the contrary, it must be visited with the severest punishment, lest the
idea should prevail that fidelity to a friend justifies even making war upon
one`s country. And this is a case which I am inclined to think, considering
how things are beginning to go, will sooner or later arise. And I care quite
as much what the state of the constitution will be after my death as what it
is now.
13. Let this, then, be laid down as the first law of friendship, that we
should ask from friends, and do for friends, only what is good. But do not let
us wait to be asked either: let there be ever an eager readiness, and an
absence of hesitation. Let us have the courage to give advice with candour. In
friendship, let the influence of friends who give good advice be paramount;
and let this influence be used to enforce advice not only in plain-spoken
terms, but sometimes, if the case demands it, with sharpness; and when so
used, let it be obeyed.
I give you these rules because I believe that some wonderful opinions are
entertained by certain persons who have, I am told, a reputation for wisdom in
Greece. There is nothing in the world, by the way, beyond the reach of their
sophistry. Well, some of them teach that we should avoid very close
friendships, for fear that one man should have to endure the anxieties of
several. Each man, say they, has enough and to spare on his own hands; it is
too bad to be involved in the cares of other people. The wisest course is to
hold the reins of friendship as loose as possible; you can then tighten or
slacken them at your will. For the first condition of a happy life is freedom
from care, which no one`s mind can enjoy if it has to travail, so to speak,
for others besides itself. Another sect, I am told, gives vent to opinions
still less generous. I briefly touched on this subject just now. They affirm
that friendships should be sought solely for the sake of the assistance they
give, and not at all from motives of feeling and affection; and that therefore
just in proportion as a man`s power and means of support are lowest, he is
most eager to gain friendships: thence it comes that weak women seek the
support of friendship more than men, the poor more than the rich, the
unfortunate rather than those esteemed prosperous. What noble philosophy! You
might just as well take the sun out of the sky as friendship from life; for
the immortal gods have given us nothing better or more delightful.
But let us examine the two doctrines. What is the value of this "freedom
from care"? It is very tempting at first sight, but in practice it has in many
cases to be put on one side. For there is no business and no course of action
demanded from us by our honour which you can consistently decline, or lay
aside when begun, from a mere wish to escape from anxiety. Nay, if we wish to
avoid anxiety we must avoid virtue itself, which necessarily involves some
anxious thoughts in showing its loathing and abhorrence for the qualities
which are opposite to itself - as kindness for ill nature, self-control for
licentiousness, courage for cowardice. Thus you may notice that it is the just
who are most pained at injustice, the brave at cowardly actions, the temperate
at depravity. It is then characteristic of a rightly ordered mind to be
pleased at what is good and grieved at the reverse. Seeing then that the wise
are not exempt from the heart-ache (which must be the case unless we suppose
all human nature rooted out of their hearts), why should we banish friendship
from our lives, for fear of being involved by it in some amount of distress?
If you take away emotion, what difference remains I don`t say between a man
and a beast, but between a man and a stone or a log of wood, or anything else
of that kind?
Neither should we give any weight to the doctrine that virtue is
something rigid and unyielding as iron. In point of fact it is in regard to
friendship, as in so many other things, so supple and sensitive that it
expands, so to speak, at a friend`s good fortune, contracts at his
misfortunes. We conclude then that mental pain which we must often encounter
on a friend`s account is not of sufficient consequence to banish friendship
from our life, any more than it is true that the cardinal virtues are to be
dispensed with because they involve certain anxieties and distresses.
14. Let me repeat then, "the clear indication of virtue, to which a mind
of like character is naturally attracted, is the beginning of friendship."
When that is the case the rise of affection is a necessity. For what can be
more irrational than to take delight in many objects incapable of response,
such as office, fame, splendid buildings, and personal decoration, and yet to
take little or none in a sentient being endowed with virtue, which has the
faculty of loving or, if I may use the expression, loving back? For nothing is
really more delightful than a return of affection, and the mutual interchange
of kind feeling and good offices. And if we add, as we may fairly do, that
nothing so powerfully attracts and draws one thing to itself as likeness does
to friendship, it will at once be admitted to be true that the good love the
good and attach them to themselves as though they were united by blood and
nature. For nothing can be more eager, or rather greedy, for what is like
itself than nature. So, my dear Fannius and Scaevola, we may look upon this as
an established fact, that between good men there is, as it were of necessity,
a kindly feeling, which is the source of friendship ordained by nature. But
this same kindliness affects the many also. For that is no unsympathetic or
selfish or exclusive virtue, which protects even whole nations and consults
their best interests. And that certainly it would not have done had it
disdained all affection for the common herd.
Again, the believers in the "interest" theory appear to me to destroy the
most attractive link in the chain of friendship. For it is not so much what
one gets by a friend that gives one pleasure, as the warmth of his feeling;
and we only care for a friend`s service if it has been prompted by affection.
And so far from its being true that lack of means is a motive for seeking
friendship, it is usually those who, being most richly endowed with wealth and
means, and above all with virtue (which, after all, is a man`s best support),
are least in need of another, that are most open-handed and beneficent. Indeed
I am inclined to think that friends ought at times to be in want of something.
For instance, what scope would my affections have had if Scipio had never
wanted my advice or co-operation at home or abroad? It is not friendship,
then, that follows material advantage, but material advantage friendship.
15. We must not therefore listen to these superfine gentlemen when they
talk of friendship, which they know neither in theory nor in practice. For
who, in heaven`s name, would choose a life of the greatest wealth and
abundance on condition of neither loving or being be loved by any creature?
That is the sort of life tyrants endure. They, of course, can count on no
fidelity, no affection, no security for the good will of any one. For them all
is suspicion and anxiety; for them their is no possibility of friendship. Who
can love one whom he fears, or by whom he knows that he is feared? Yet such
men have a show of friendship offered them, but it is only a fair-weather
show. If it ever happen that they fall, as it generally does, they will at
once understand how friendless they are. So they say Tarquin observed in his
exile that he never knew which of his friends were real and which sham, until
he had ceased to be able to repay either. Though what surprises me is that a
man of his proud and overbearing character should have a friend at all. And as
it was his character that prevented his having genuine friends, so it often
happens in the case of men of unusually great means - their very wealth
forbids faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune blind herself; but she
generally makes those blind also who enjoy her favours. They are carried, so
to speak, beyond themselves with self-conceit and self-will; nor can anything
be more perfectly intolerable than a successful fool. You may often see it.
Men who before had pleasant manners enough undergo a complete change on
attaining power of office. They despise their old friends: devote themselves
to new.
Now, can anything be more foolish than that men who have all the
opportunities which prosperity, wealth, and great means can bestow, should
secure all else which money can buy - horses, servants, splendid upholstering,
and costly plate - but do not secure friends, who are, if I may use the
expression, the most valuable and beautiful furniture of life? And yet, when
they acquire the former, they know not who will enjoy them, nor for whom they
may be taking all this trouble; for they will one and all eventually belong to
the strongest: while each man has a stable and inalienable ownership in his
friendships. And even if those possessions, which are, in a manner, the gifts
of fortune, do prove permanent, life can never be anything but joyless which
is without the consolations and companionship of friends.
16. To turn to another branch of our subject: We must now endeavour to
ascertain what limits are to be observed in friendship - what is the
boundary-line, so to speak, beyond which our affection is not to go. On this
point I notice three opinions, with none of which I agree. One is that we
should love our friend just as much as we love ourselves, and no more;
another, that our affection to friends, should exactly correspond and equal
theirs to us; a third, that a man should be valued at exactly the same rate as
he values himself. To not one of these opinions do I assent. The first, which
holds that our regard for ourselves is to be the measure of our regard for our
friend, is not true; for how many things there are which we would never have
done for our own sakes, but do for the sake of a friend! We submit to make
requests from unworthy people, to descend even to supplication; to be sharper
in invective, more violent in attack. Such actions are not creditable in our
own interests, but highly so in those of our friends. There are many
advantages too which men of upright character voluntarily forgo, or of which
they are content to be deprived, that their friends may enjoy them rather than
themselves.
The second doctrine is that which limits friendship to an exact equality
in mutual good offices and good feelings. But such a view reduces friendship
to a question of figures in a spirit far too narrow and illiberal, as though
the object were to have an exact balance in a debtor and creditor account.
True friendship appears to me to be something richer and more generous than
that comes to; and not to be so narrowly on its guard against giving more than
it receives. In such a matter we must not be always afraid of something being
wasted or running over in our measure, or of more than is justly due being
devoted to our friendship.
But the last limit proposed is the worst, namely, that a friend`s
estimate of himself is to be the measure of our estimate of him. It often
happens that a man has too humble an idea of himself, or takes too despairing
a view of his chance of bettering his fortune. In such a case a friend ought
not to take the view of him which he takes of himself. Rather he should do all
he can to raise his drooping spirits, and lead him to more cheerful hopes and
thoughts.
We must then find some other limit. But I must first mention the
sentiment which used to call forth Scipio`s severest criticism. He often said
that no one ever gave utterance to anything more diametrically opposed to the
spirit of friendship than the author of the dictum, "You should love your
friend with the consciousness that you may one day hate him." He could not be
induced to believe that it was rightfully attributed to Bias, who was counted
as one of the Seven Sages. It was the sentiment of some person with sinister
motives or selfish ambition, or who regarded everything as it affected his own
supremacy. How can a man be friends with another, if he thinks it possible
that he may be his enemy? Why, it will follow that he must wish and desire his
friend to commit as many mistakes as possible, that he may have all the more
handles against him; and, conversely, that he must be annoyed, irritated, and
jealous at the right actions or good fortune of his friends. This maxim, then,
let it be whose it will, is the utter destruction of friendship. The true rule
is to take such care in the selection of our friends as never to enter upon a
friendship with a man whom we could under any circumstances come to hate. And
even if we are unlucky in our choice, we must put up with it - according to
Scipio - in preference to making calculations as to a future breach.
17. The real limit to be observed in friendship is this: the characters
of two friends must be stainless. There must be complete harmony of interests,
purpose, and aims, without exception. Then if the case arises of a friend`s
wish (not strictly right in itself) calling for support in a matter involving
his life or reputation, we must make some concession from the straight path -
on condition, that is to say, that extreme disgrace is not the consequence.
Something must be conceded to friendship. And yet we must not be entirely
careless of our reputation, nor regard the good opinion of our fellow-citizens
as a weapon which we can afford to despise in conducting the business of our
life, however lowering it may be to tout for it by flattery and smooth words.
We must by no means abjure virtue, which secures us affection.
But to return again to Scipio, the sole author of the discourse on
friendship: He used to complain that there was nothing on which men bestowed
so little pains: that every one could tell exactly how many goats or sheep he
had, but not how many friends; and while they took pains in procuring the
former, they were utterly careless in selecting friends, and possessed no
particular marks, so to speak, or tokens by which they might judge of their
suitability for friendship. Now the qualities we ought to look out for in
making our selection are firmness, stability, constancy. There is a plentiful
lack of men so endowed, and it is difficult to form a judgment without
testing. Now this testing can only be made during the actual existence of the
friendship; for friendship so often precedes the formation of a judgment, and
makes a previous test impossible. If we are prudent then, we shall rein in our
impulse to affection as we do chariot horses. We make a preliminary trial of
horses. So we should of friendship; and should test our friends` characters by
a kind of tentative friendship. It may often happen that the untrustworthiness
of certain men is completely displayed in a small money matter; others who are
proof against a small sum are detected if it be large. But even if some are
found who think it mean to prefer money to friendship, where shall we look for
those who put friendship before office, civil or military promotions, and
political power, and who, when the choice lies between these things on the one
side and the claims of friendship on the other, do not give a strong
preference to the former? It is not in human nature to be indifferent to
political power; and if the price men have to pay for it is the sacrifice of
friendship, they think their treason will be thrown into the shade by the
magnitude of the reward. This is why true friendship is very difficult to find
among those who engage in politics and the contest for office. Where can you
find the man to prefer his friend`s advancement to his own? And to say nothing
of that, think how grievous and almost intolerable it is to most men to share
political disaster. You will scarcely find any one who can bring himself to do
that. And though what Ennius says is quite true, - "the hour of need shews the
friend indeed," - yet it is in these two ways that most people betray their
untrustworthiness and inconstancy, by looking down on friends when they are
themselves prosperous, or deserting them in their distress. A man, then, who
has shewn a firm, unshaken, and unvarying friendship in both these
contingencies we must reckon as one of a class the rarest in the world, and
all but superhuman.
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