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Part I
Part I
The augur Quintus Mucius Scaevola used to recount a number of stories
about his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius, accurately remembered and charmingly
told; and whenever he talked about him always gave him the title of "the wise"
without any hesitation. I had been introduced by my father to Scaevola as soon
as I had assumed the toga virilis, and I took advantage of the introduction
never to quit the venerable man`s side as long as I was able to stay and he
was spared to us. The consequence was that I committed to memory many
disquisitions of his, as well as many short pointed apophthegms, and, in
short, took as much advantage of his wisdom as I could. When he died, I
attached myself to Scaevola the Pontifex, whom I may venture to call quite the
most distinguished of our countrymen for ability and uprightness. But of this
latter I shall take other occasions to speak. To return to Scaevola the augur:
Among many other occasions I particularly remember one. He was sitting on a
semicircular garden-bench, as was his custom, when I and a very few intimate
friends were there, and he chanced to turn the conversation upon a subject
which about that time was in many people`s mouths. You must remember, Atticus,
for you were very intimate with Publius Sulpicius, what expressions of
astonishment, or even indignation, were called forth by his mortal quarrel, as
tribune, with the consul Quintus Pompeius, with whom he had formerly lived on
terms of the closest intimacy and affection. Well, on this occasion, happening
to mention this particular circumstance, Scaevola detailed to us a discourse
of Laelius on friendship delivered to himself and Laelius` other son-in-law,
Gaius Fannius, son of Marcus Fannius, a few days after the death of Africanus.
The points of that discussion I committed to memory, and have arranged them in
this book at my own discretion. For I have brought the speakers, as it were,
personally on to my stage to prevent the constant "said I" and "said he" of a
narrative, and to give the discourse the air of being orally delivered in our
hearing.
You have often urged me to write something on Friendship, and I quite
acknowledged that the subject seemed one worth everybody`s investigation, and
specially suited to the close intimacy that has existed between you and me.
Accordingly I was quite ready to benefit the public at your request.
As to the dramatis personae: In the treatise On Old Age, which I
dedicated to you, I introduced Cato as chief speaker. No one, I thought, could
with greater propriety speak on old age than one who had been an old man
longer than any one else, and had been exceptionally vigorous in his old age.
Similarly, having learnt from tradition that of all friendships that between
Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio was the most remarkable, I thought Laelius
was just the person to support the chief part in a discussion on friendship
which Scaevola remembered him to have actually taken. Moreover, a discussion
of this sort gains somehow in weight from the authority of men of ancient
days, especially if they happen to have been distinguished. So it comes about
that in reading over what I have myself written I have a feeling at times that
it is actually Cato that is speaking, not I.
Finally, as I sent the former essay to you as a gift from one old man to
another, so I have dedicated this On Friendship as a most affectionate friend
to his friend. In the former Cato spoke, who was the oldest and wisest man of
his day; in this Laelius speaks on friendship - Laelius, who was at once a
wise man (that was the title given him) and eminent for his famous friendship.
Please forget me for a while; imagine Laelius to be speaking.
Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to call on their father-in-law
after the death of Africanus. They start the subject; Laelius answers them.
And the whole essay on friendship is his. In reading it you will recognise a
picture of yourself.
2. Fannius. You are quite right, Laelius! there never was a better or
more illustrious character than Africanus. But you should consider that at the
present moment all eyes are on you. Everybody calls you "the wise" par
excellence, and thinks you so. The same mark of respect was lately paid Cato,
and we know that in the last generation Lucius Atilius was called "the wise."
But in both cases the word was applied with a certain difference. Atilius was
so called from his reputation as a jurist; Cato got the name as a kind of
honorary title and in extreme old age because of his varied experience of
affairs, and his reputation for foresight and firmness, and the sagacity of
the opinions which he delivered in senate and forum. You, however, are
regarded as "wise" in a somewhat different sense - not alone on account of
natural ability and character, but also from your industry and learning; and
not in the sense in which the vulgar, but that in which scholars, give that
title. In this sense we do not read of any one being called wise in Greece
except one man at Athens; and he, to be sure, had been declared by the oracle
of Apollo also to be "the supremely wise man." For those who commonly go by
the name of the Seven Sages are not admitted into the category of the wise by
fastidious critics. Your wisdom people believe to consist in this, that you
look upon yourself as self-sufficing and regard the changes and chances of
mortal life as powerless to affect your virtue. Accordingly they are always
asking me, and doubtless also our Scaevola here, how you bear the death of
Africanus. This curiosity has been the more excited from the fact that on the
Nones of this month, when we augurs met as usual in the suburban villa of
Decimus Brutus for consultation, you were not present, though it had always
been your habit to keep that appointment and perform that duty with the utmost
punctuality.
Scaevola. Yes, indeed, Laelius, I am often asked the question mentioned
by Fannius. But I answer in accordance with what I have observed: I say that
you bear in a reasonable manner the grief which you have sustained in the
death of one who was at once a man of the most illustrious character and a
very dear friend. That of course you could not but be affected - anything else
would have been wholly unnatural in a man of your gentle nature - but that the
cause of your non-attendance at our college meeting was illness, not
melancholy.
Laelius. Thanks, Scaevola! You are quite right; you spoke the exact
truth. For in fact I had no right to allow myself to be withdrawn from a duty
which I had regularly performed, as long as I was well, by any personal
misfortune; nor do I think that anything that can happen will cause a man of
principle to intermit a duty. As for your telling me, Fannius, of the
honourable appellation given me (an appellation to which I do not recognise my
title, and to which I make no claim), you doubtless act from feelings of
affection; but I must say that you seem to me to do less than justice to Cato.
If any one was ever "wise," - of which I have my doubts - he was. Putting
aside everything else, consider how he bore his son`s death! I had not
forgotten Paulus; I had seen with my own eyes Gallus. But they lost their sons
when mere children; Cato his when he was a full-grown man with an assured
reputation. Do not therefore be in a hurry to reckon as Cato`s superior even
that same famous personage whom Apollo, as you say, declared to be "the
wisest." Remember the former`s reputation rests on deeds, the latter`s on
words.
3. Now, as far as I am concerned (I speak to both of you now), believe
me, the case stands thus: If I were to say that I am not affected by regret
for Scipio, I must leave the philosophers to justify my conduct, but in point
of fact I should be telling a lie. Affected of course I am by the loss of a
friend as I think there will never be again, such as I can fearlessly say
there never was before. But I stand in no need of medicine. I can find my own
consolation, and it consists chiefly in my being free from the mistaken notion
which generally causes pain at the departure of friends. To Scipio I am
convinced no evil has befallen: mine is the disaster, if disaster there be;
and to be severely distressed at one`s own misfortunes does not show that you
love your friend, but that you love yourself.
As for him, who can say that all is not more than well? For, unless he
had taken the fancy to wish for immortality, the last thing of which he ever
thought, what is there for which mortal man may wish that he did not attain?
In his early manhood he more than justified by extraordinary personal courage
the hopes which his fellow-citizens had conceived of him as a child. He
never was a candidate for the consulship, yet was elected consul twice: the
first time before the legal age; the second at a time which, as far as he was
concerned, was soon enough, but was near being too late for the interests of
the State. By the overthrow of two cities which were the most bitter enemies
of our Empire, he put an end not only to the wars then raging, but also to the
possibility of others in the future. What need to mention the exquisite grace
of his manners, his dutiful devotion to his mother, his generosity to his
sisters, his liberality to his relations, the integrity of his conduct to
every one? You know all this already. Finally, the estimation in which his
fellow-citizens held him has been shown by the signs of mourning which
accompanied his obsequies. What could such a man have gained by the addition
of a few years? Though age need not be a burden, - as I remember Cato arguing
in the presence of myself and Scipio two years before he died, - yet it cannot
but take away the vigour and freshness which Scipio was still enjoying. We may
conclude therefore that his life, from the good fortune which had attended him
and the glory he had obtained, was so circumstanced that it could not be
bettered, while the suddenness of his death saved him the sensation of dying.
As to the manner of his death it is difficult to speak; you see what people
suspect. Thus much, however, I may say: Scipio in his lifetime saw many days
of supreme triumph and exultation, but none more magnificent than his last, on
which, upon the rising of the Senate, he was escorted by the senators and the
people of Rome, by the allies, and by the Latins, to his own door. From such
an elevation of popular esteem the next step seems naturally to be an ascent
to the gods above, rather than a descent to Hades.
4. For I am not one of these modern philosophers who maintain that our
souls perish with our bodies, and that death ends all. With me ancient opinion
has more weight: whether it be that of our own ancestors, who attributed such
solemn observances to the dead, as they plainly would not have done if they
had believed them to be wholly annihilated; or that of the philosophers who
once visited this country, and who by their maxims and doctrines educated
Magna Graecia, which at that time was in a flourishing condition, though it
has now been ruined; or that of the man who was declared by Apollo`s oracle to
be "most wise," and who used to teach without the variation which is to be
found in most philosophers that "the souls of men are divine, and that when
they have quitted the body a return to heaven is open to them, least difficult
to those who have been most virtuous and just." This opinion was shared by
Scipio. Only a few days before his death - as though he had a presentiment of
what was coming - he discoursed for three days on the state of the republic.
The company consisted of Philus and Manlius and several others, and I had
brought you, Scaevola, along with me. The last part of his discourse referred
principally to the immortality of the soul; for he told us what he had heard
from the elder Africanus in a dream. Now if it be true that in proportion to a
man`s goodness the escape from what may be called the prison and bonds of the
flesh is easiest, whom can we imagine to have had an easier voyage to the gods
than Scipio? I am disposed to think, therefore, that in his case mourning
would be a sign of envy rather than of friendship. If, however, the truth
rather is that the body and soul perish together, and that no sensation
remains, then though there is nothing good in death, at least there is nothing
bad. Remove sensation, and a man is exactly as though he had never been born;
and yet that this man was born is a joy to me, and will be a subject to
rejoicing to this State to its last hour.
Wherefore, as I said before, all is as well as possible with him. Not so
with me; for as I entered life before him, it would have been fairer for me to
leave it also before him. Yet such is the pleasure I take in recalling our
friendship, that I look upon my life as having been a happy one because I have
spent it with Scipio. With him I was associated in public and private
business; with him I lived in Rome and served abroad; and between us there was
the most complete harmony in our tastes, our pursuits, and our sentiments,
which is the true secret of friendship. It is not therefore in that reputation
for wisdom mentioned just now by Fannius - especially as it happens to be
groundless - that I find my happiness so much, as in the hope that the memory
of our friendship will be lasting. What makes me care the more about this is
the fact that in all history there are scarcely three or four pairs of friends
on record; and it is classed with them that I cherish a hope of the friendship
of Scipio and Laelius being known to posterity.
Fannius. Of course that must be so, Laelius. But since you have mentioned
the word friendship, and we are at leisure, you would be doing me a great
kindness, and I expect Scaevola also, if you would do as it is your habit to
do when asked questions on other subjects, and tell us your sentiments about
friendship, its nature, and the rules to be observed in regard to it.
Scaevola. I shall of course be delighted. Fannius has anticipated the
very request I was about to make. So you will be doing us both a great favour.
5. Laelius. I should certainly have no objection if I felt confidence in
myself. For the theme is a noble one, and we are (as Fannius has said) at
leisure. But who am I? and what ability have I? What you propose is all very
well for professional philosophers, who are used, particularly if Greeks, to
have the subject for discussion proposed to them on the spur of the moment. It
is a task of considerable difficulty, and requires no little practice.
Therefore for a set discourse on friendship you must go, I think, to
professional lecturers. All I can do is to urge on you to regard friendship as
the greatest thing in the world; for there is nothing which so fits in with
our nature, or is so exactly what we want in prosperity or adversity.
But I must at the very beginning lay down this principle - friendship can
only exist between good men. I do not, however, press this too closely, like
the philosophers who push their definitions to a superfluous accuracy. They
have truth on their side, perhaps, but it is of no practical advantage. Those,
I mean, who say that no one but the "wise" is "good." Granted, by all means.
But the "wisdom" they mean is one to which no mortal ever yet attained. We
must concern ourselves with the facts of everyday life as we find it - not
imaginary and ideal perfections. Even Gaius Fannius, Manius Curius, and
Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors decided to be "wise," I could never
declare to be so according to their standard. Let them, then, keep this word
"wisdom" to themselves. Everybody is irritated by it; no one understands what
it means. Let them but grant that the men I mentioned were "good." No, they
won`t do that either. No one but the "wise" can be allowed that title, say
they. Well, then, let us dismiss them and manage as best we may with our own
poor mother wit, as the phrase is.
We mean then by the "good" those whose actions and lives leave no
question as to their honour, purity, equity, and liberality; who are free from
greed, lust, and violence; and who have the courage of their convictions. The
men I have just named may serve as examples. Such men as these being generally
accounted "good," let us agree to call them so, on the ground that to the best
of human ability they follow nature as the most perfect guide to a good life.
Now this truth seems clear to me, that nature has so formed us that a
certain tie unites us all, but that this tie becomes stronger from proximity.
So it is that fellow-citizens are preferred in our affections to foreigners,
relations to strangers; for in their case Nature herself has caused a kind of
friendship to exist, though it is one which lacks some of the elements of
permanence. Friendship excels relationship in this, that whereas you may
eliminate affection from relationship, you cannot do so from friendship.
Without it relationship still exists in name, friendship does not. You may
best understand this friendship by considering that, whereas the merely
natural ties uniting the human race are indefinite, this one is so
concentrated, and confined to so narrow a sphere, that affection is ever
shared by two persons only, or at most by a few.
6. Now friendship may be thus defined: a complete accord on all subjects
human and divine, joined with mutual good will and affection. And with the
exception of wisdom, I am inclined to think nothing better than this has been
given to man by the immortal gods. There are people who give the palm to
riches or to good health, or to power and office, many even to sensual
pleasures. This last is the ideal of brute beasts; and of the others we may
say that they are frail and uncertain, and depend less on our own prudence
than on the caprice of fortune. Then there are those who find the "chief good"
in virtue. Well, that is a noble doctrine. But the very virtue they talk of is
the parent and preserver of friendship, and without it friendship cannot
possibly exist.
Let us, I repeat, use the word virtue in the ordinary acceptation and
meaning of the term, and do not let us define it in high-flown language. Let
us account as good the persons usually considered so, such as Paulus, Cato,
Gallus, Scipio, and Philus. Such men as these are good enough for everyday
life; and we need not trouble ourselves about those ideal characters which are
nowhere to be met with.
Well, between men like these the advantages of friendship are almost more
than I can say. To begin with, how can life be worth living, to use the words
of Ennius, which lacks that repose which is to be found in the mutual good
will of a friend? What can be more delightful than to have some one to whom
you can say everything with the same absolute confidence as to yourself? Is
not prosperity robbed of half its value if you have no one to share your joy?
On the other hand, misfortunes would be hard to bear if there were not some
one to feel them even more acutely than yourself. In a word, other objects of
ambition serve for particular ends - riches for use, power for securing
homage, office for reputation, pleasure for enjoyment, health for freedom from
pain and the full use of the functions of the body. But friendship embraces
innumerable advantages. Turn which way you please, you will find it at hand.
It is everywhere; and yet never out of place, never unwelcome. Fire and water
themselves, to use a common expression, are not of more universal use than
friendship. I am not now speaking of the common or modified form of it, though
even that is a source of pleasure and profit, but of that true and complete
friendship which existed between the select few who are known to fame. Such
friendship enhances prosperity, and relieves adversity of its burden by
halving and sharing it.
7. And great and numerous as are the blessings of friendship, this
certainly is the sovereign one, that it gives us bright hopes for the future
and forbids weakness and despair. In the face of a true friend a man sees as
it were a second self. So that where his friend is he is; if his friend be
rich, he is not poor; though he be weak, his friend`s strength is his; and in
his friend`s life he enjoys a second life after his own is finished. This last
is perhaps the most difficult to conceive. But such is the effect of the
respect, the loving remembrance, and the regret of friends which follow us to
the grave. While they take the sting out of death, they add a glory to the
life of the survivors. Nay, if you eliminate from nature the tie of affection,
there will be an end of house and city, nor will so much as the cultivation of
the soil be left. If you don`t see the virtue of friendship and harmony, you
may learn it by observing the effects of quarrels and feuds. Was any family
ever so well established, any State so firmly settled, as to be beyond the
reach of utter destruction from animosities and factions? This may teach you
the immense advantage of friendship.
They say that a certain philosopher of Agrigentum, in a Greek poem,
pronounced with the authority of an oracle the doctrine that whatever in
nature and the universe was unchangeable was so in virtue of the binding force
of friendship; whatever was changeable was so by the solvent power of discord.
And indeed this is a truth which everybody understands and practically attests
by experience. For if any marked instance of loyal friendship in confronting
or sharing danger comes to light, every one applauds it to the echo. What
cheers there were, for instance, all over the theatre at a passage in the new
play of my friend and guest Pacuvius; where, the king not knowing which of the
two was Orestes, Pylades declared himself to be Orestes, that he might die in
his stead, while the real Orestes kept on asserting that it was he. The
audience rose en masse and clapped their hands. And this was at an incident in
fiction: what would they have done, must we suppose, if it had been in real
life? You can easily see what a natural feeling it is, when men who would not
have had the resolution to act thus themselves, shewed how right they thought
it in another.
I don`t think I have any more to say about friendship. If there is any
more, and I have no doubt there is much, you must, if you care to do so,
consult those who profess to discuss such matters.
Fannius. We would rather apply to you. Yet I have often consulted such
persons, and have heard what they had to say with a certain satisfaction. But
in your discourse one somehow feels that there is a different strain.
Scaevola. You would have said that still more, Fannius, if you had been
present the other day in Scipio`s pleasure-grounds when we had the discussion
about the State. How splendidly he stood up for justice against Philus`
elaborate speech!
Fannius. Ah! it was naturally easy for the justest of men to stand up for
justice.
Scaevola, Well, then, what about friendship? Who could discourse on it
more easily than the man whose chief glory is a friendship maintained with the
most absolute fidelity, constancy, and integrity?
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